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e paper compares the eects of market-based and command-and-control climate policies
on the direction of technical change and the prevention of environmental disasters. Drawing
on the model proposed in Acemoglu et al. (2012, American Economic Review), we show that
market-based policies (carbon taxes and subsidies towards clean sectors) exhibit bounded win-
dow of opportunities: delays in their implementation make them completely ineective both
in redirecting technical change and in avoiding environmental catastrophes. On the contrary,
we nd that command-and-control interventions guarantee policy eectiveness irrespectively
on the timing of their introduction. As command-and-control policies are always able to direct
technical change toward “green” technologies and to prevent climate disasters, they constitute
a valuable alternative to market-based interventions.
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1 Introduction
In this work, we extend the seminal contribution of Acemoglu et al. (2012)1 to study the eec-
tiveness of market-based (M-B) and command-and-control (C&C) policies in redirecting technical
change towards “green” innovations, thus preventing environmental catastrophes related to climate
change.
One of the major challenges faced by humankind today is the rising temperature caused by
the increasing consumption of fossil fuels, and the appropriate policy responses. e debate is still
unseled as some researchers call for major and immediate actions (Stern, 2007), whereas others
suggest limited and gradual policy interventions (see e.g. Nordhaus, 2007).
Acemoglu et al. (2012) contribute to such debate with a two-sector model of directed technical
change, which allows to study howmarket-based environmental policies can aect the development
of “dirty” and “green” technologies, thus impacting on climate change. When the clean and dirty
inputs are “strong ” substitute (more on that in Acemoglu et al., 2012, and in Section 4.3 below.), an
optimal M-B environmental policy, grounded on a “carbon” tax and a green research subsidy, can
redirect technical change towards the green sector, preventing environmental catastrophes. How-
ever, given path-dependency in the direction of technical change (Aghion et al., 2015), the window
of opportunity of such policy actions is limited: if the technology gap between the dirty and green
inputs becomes suciently high, M-B interventions are ineective and environmental disasters will
certainly occur. e policy window is shorter when the two inputs are “weak” substitutes. More-
over, in the laer case (as well as when inputs are complementary) M-B interventions cannot avoid
an environmental catastrophe unless they stop the growth of the economy.
We expand themodel of Acemoglu et al. (2012) to account for command-and control policies and
we study their impact on technical change and climate dynamics. e adoption of regulations not
grounded on market incentives is quite common in environmental policy and it appears to be very
eective. For instance, some international agreements (e.g. the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer) x an exogenous ceiling on specic polluting concentrations. Shapiro
andWalker (2015) nd that the increasing stringency of U.S. environmental regulation accounts for
1For an extension see also Acemoglu et al. (2015).
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three quarters of the 60% decrease in pollution emissions (e.g. nitrogen oxides, particulate maer,
sulfur dioxide, and volatile organic compounds) from U.S. manufacturing in the period from 1990
to 2008. More generally, both price and quantity forms of control can solve allocation problems and
there is no a priori criterion to favor one instrument over the other (Weitzman, 1974). e choice
of the most appropriate mode of control should be grounded only on its performance evaluated
according to “economic” criteria.
We show that a command-and-control policy, which xes the maximum amount of dirty inputs
for each unit of clean ones, is always able to redirect technical change towards the green technology
independently on the timing of its implementation, and to avoid environmental catastrophes. In
that, C&C policies are a valuable alternative to M-B ones to reach a green transition whenever the
window of opportunity for environmental interventions is bounded. Moreover, even if the dirty and
clean inputs are weak substitutes or complementary, command-and-control interventions imposing
a ceiling to the use of polluting inputs, avoid disasters without halting economic growth.
e rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present a literature review in Section 2 and
the model in Section 3. Alternative policies interventions are compared in Section 4. Finally, we
discuss the results in Section 5.
2 Literature review
e optimal policy to induce a large-scale transition from dirty to clean production system is — in
the absence of any other market failure — a Pigouvian price on the polluting substances, typically
a carbon tax on emissions (Nordhaus, 1991). Moreover, in a world with perfect knowledge and no
uncertainty, the standard duality argument implies the equivalence between the use of prices and
quantities as mitigation policy instruments. However, Weitzman (1974) shows that in an imperfect
world, the relative advantage of price policies vis-a`-vis quantity ones can vary according to the
amount and type of inadequate information and uncertainty. As a consequence, quantity-based
mitigation policies could be more ecient that price-based ones.
Relatedly, many studies have compared the eects of market-based (M-B) and command-and-
control (C&C) policies (see Hepburn, 2006, for an extensive comparison of environmental and cli-
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mate policies). Buchanan (1969); Li and Shi (2010) and Li and Sun (2015) emphasize the drawbacks
of marked-based instruments and support the use of regulation. e same conclusion is suggested
by recent empirical evidences (see e.g. Lee, Veloso and Hounshell, 2011; Shapiro and Walker, 2015).
On the contrary, Rozenberg, Vogt-Schilb and Hallegae (2014) show that when underinvestment
in polluting capital is possible, carbon pricing is superior to C&C interventions. More generally,
there is no crystal-clear agreement about the identication of the “best” climate policy and the way
to compare dierent instruments. For example, Goulder and Parry (2008) consider a wide range of
possible interventions, and they analyze the extent they meet a variety of major evaluation criteria,
including cost-eectiveness, distributional equity, the ability to address uncertainties, and political
feasibility. ey nd that no single instrument is clearly superior and that ensembles of dierent
climate policies can be more eective.
In a seminal contribution, Acemoglu et al. (2012) study how directed technical change can sup-
port the transition to a “green” economy and prevent environmental disasters (see Popp, 2004, for
an earlier contribution). ey nd that the joint adoption of carbon taxes and research subsidies
can direct innovation towards clean technologies (on the complementarity of tax and subsidies see
also Grimaud, Laorgue and Magn, 2011).
e fundamental role of innovation for the eectiveness of climate and environmental policy
has been explored extensively both at theoretical (Goulder and Schneider, 1999; Gillingham, Newell
and Pizer, 2008; Oo and Reilly, 2008) and empirical levels (Popp, 2002; Jae, Newell and Stavins,
2003).2 Such contributions point out that the rewards from the development of new technologies
do come not from current or future pollution reductions, but from the expected prots associated
with technological improvements. Expected protability depends in turn on the size of the econ-
omy (Sue Wing, 2003), the scarcity of fossil fuels (Gans, 2012), and the past history of innovations
(Acemoglu et al., 2012; Aghion et al., 2015).
In particular, Acemoglu et al. (2015) show that if the initial technological gap between dirty
and clean technologies is too wide, the potential transition to clean technology cannot occur as
clean research must climb several steps to catch up with dirty technology and the gap discourages
2For an excellent review on technological change and the environment see also Popp, Newell and Jae (2010).
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research eorts in “green” technology. As a consequence, the path-dependency of technical change
should be considered in assessing the eectiveness of dierent climate policy instruments to induce
“green” transitions, as well as to prevent environmental disasters related to excessive greenhouse
gasses emissions. is is exactly the starting point of the present paper. In addition, whenever
history plays a relevant role, the timing of policy interventions is crucial. While Gerlagh, Kverndokk
and Rosendahl (2009) show that the introduction of optimal emission reduction policies strongly
depends on the set of instruments available, we take the opposite perspective and study how policies
can loose their eects as time goes by.
3 e model
e baseline structure of the model is akin to the one in Acemoglu et al. (2012). ere is a continuum
of households (composed of workers, entrepreneurs and scientists) with utility function:
∞∑
t=0
1
(1 + ρ)t
u(Ct, St), (1)
where ρ is the discount rate, C is nal consumption good, and S ∈ [0, S¯] captures the quality of
the environment. Naturally, the instantaneous utility function is increasing in consumption and
environmental quality.3
On the supply side, a homogeneous nal good is produced under perfect competition employing
clean and dirty inputs Yc and Yd:
Yt =
(
Y
ǫ−1
ǫ
ct + Y
ǫ−1
ǫ
dt
) ǫ
ǫ−1
, (2)
where ǫ ∈ (0,+∞) is the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs. Note that the two inputs
are complements when ǫ < 1 and substitutes if ǫ > 1.
Both Yc and Yd are produced using labor and a continuum of sector-specic machines according
to the production functions:
Yjt = L
1−α
jt
∫ 1
0
A1−αjit x
α
jitdi (3)
3e utility function is twice dierentiable and jointly concave in C and S. Moreover, conditions (2) and (3) in Ace-
moglu et al. (2012) hold. Households’ utility considerable falls when environmental quality approaches zero. Conversely,
if S = S¯, further increases of environmental quality do not lead to utility improvements.
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with j ∈ {c, d} and α ∈ (0, 1), Ajit is the productivity of machine i in sector j and xjit is the
quantity of such machine. e aggregate productivity of the two sectors is dened as:
Ajt ≡
∫ 1
0
Ajitdi. (4)
Total labor supply is normalized to 1 and themarket clearing condition for labor requiresLct+Ldt ≤
1. Machines in both clean and dirty sectors are produced by monopolistic competitive rms. e
cost of producing a single machine is constant across time and sectors and corresponds to ψ = α2.
In both industry, an innovation occurs if a scientist successfully discovers a new design. At
the beginning of each period scientists try to develop a new clean or dirty technology. If she is
successful, which happenswith probability ηj ∈ (0, 1), she obtains a one-year patent for itsmachine
i and becomes a monopolistic supplier.4 Innovations increase the productivity of a machine by a
factor 1 + γ, with γ > 0. Normalizing the number of scientists to 1 the market clearing condition
for scientists becomes: sct+sdt ≤ 1, where sjt indicates the share of scientists conducting research
in sector j = {c, d} at time t. As scientists are randomly allocated to machines in the sector they
choose, the average productivity of sector j evolves according to
Ajt = (1 + γηjsjt)Ajt−1. (5)
e variation of environmental quality St depends on environmental degradation linked to the
production of dirty inputs, as well as on environmental regeneration due to the intrinsic dynamics
of the Earth’s physical and biological system:
St+1 = −ξYdt + (1 + δ)St, (6)
with St+1 bounded between 0 and S. e environmental degradation term catches the negative
eects of CO2 emissions,
5 while the environmental regeneration term captures the absorption of
CO2 by the oceans and the biosphere (Oeschger et al., 1975; Goudriaan and Ketner, 1984; Nordhaus,
1992). Note that if St = 0 an environmental disaster occurs.
4In sectors where the innovation process is unsuccessful, a one-year patent is randomly assigned to one of the pro-
ducers using the old technology.
5One could reasonably dene CO2 emissions as directly proportional to the use of dirty inputs: Emt ∝ Ydt.
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4 Climate policies and the direction of technical change
In this section we rst recall the laissez-faire equilibrium (Section 4.1), where no environmental poli-
cies are in place. We then study the impact of dierent environmental policies aiming at redirecting
technical change towards the green sector in order to reduce the total amount of dirty inputs used
in the economy and avoid environmental disasters. More specically, we compare the success of
market-based policies (cf. Section 4.2), based on carbon tax and subsidies to the clean sector, vis-
a`-vis command-and-control interventions (cf. Section 4.3), which x ceilings for the production of
dirty inputs.
4.1 e laissez-faire equilibrium
As in Acemoglu et al. (2012), an equilibrium is represented by a sequence of wages (wt), prices for
inputs (pjt) and machines (pjit), demands for inputs (Yjt) and machines (xjit), labor (Ljt), quality of
environment (St) and research allocations of scientists (sjt) such that: rms maximize their prots,
scientists maximize their expected prots, labor and input markets clear, and environmental quality
evolves according to (6). We recall that the laissez-faire equilibrium occurs when no environmental
policies are in place.
In line with Acemoglu et al. (2012), let us assume that the productivity of the green sector is
suciently lower than the one of the dirty industry:
Assumption 1. Ac0
Ad0
< min
(
(1 + γηc)
−
ϕ+1
ϕ
(
ηc
ηd
) 1
ϕ
, (1 + γηd)
ϕ+1
ϕ
(
ηc
ηd
) 1
ϕ
)
,
with φ ≡ (1 − α)(1 − ǫ). Assumption 1 will hold throughout the rest of the paper. If ǫ > 1,
innovation occurs only in the dirty sector and the long run growth rate of dirty inputs is γηd. If
ǫ < 1, innovation happens rst in the clean sector, then it will occur also in the fossil fuel one and
the long run growth rate of dirty inputs will be (ηdηc)/(ηd + ηc) < ηd. If assumption 1 holds and
ǫ > 1, the laissez-faire allocation will always produce an environmental disaster, i.e. St = 0 for
some t (Acemoglu et al., 2012).
Note that the direction of technical change is determined by the incentives scientists face when
they decide to conduct their research in the clean or dirty sector. More specically, the relative ben-
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et from undertaking research in sector c rather than in sector d is expressed by the ratio (Acemoglu
et al., 2012):
Πct
Πdt
=
ηc
ηd
(
pct
pct
) 1
1−α Lct
Ldt
Act−1
Adt−1
. (7)
Equation (7) reveals that the relative protability of research in the two sectors can be decom-
posed in three components which capture productivity dierentials (Act−1/Adt−1), relative prices
((pct/pdt)
1
1−α ), and market size (Lct/Ldt). Finally, the equilibrium demand of the two inputs is
determined by:
Yc = (A
ϕ
c +A
ϕ
d )
−
α+ϕ
ϕ Aα+ϕc Ad, (8)
Yd = (A
ϕ
c +A
ϕ
d )
−
α+ϕ
ϕ Aα+ϕd Ac, (9)
whose evolution over time depends on the sectoral allocation of scientists (cf. Equation 7), and on
the stochastic process characterizing the dynamics of machines’ productivity.
4.2 Market-based environmental policies
In the model, a market-based (M-B) environmental policy is composed of a carbon tax and a subsidy
towards clean research proportional to rms’ prots. When the two inputs Yc and Yd are substitutes
(ǫ > 1) and the economy is initially stacked in the bad laissez-faire equilibrium, Acemoglu et al.
(2012) shows that the social planner can redirect technical change towards the green technology
introducing a carbon-tax td on the production of dirty inputs and a public subsidy qct supporting
the research in the clean sector.6 Moreover, if the two inputs are strong substitutes (ǫ > 1/(1−α)),
M-B policy is temporary.
However, the direction of technical change is not only dependent on policy variables (tdt and
qct). In fact, the past history of innovations, which in turns determines the relative productivity of
the clean and dirty sectors and the protability of performing research therein, plays a fundamental
role. As a consequence, given the importance of path dependency (Aghion et al., 2015), even if
6roughout the model we assume that subsidies have to be nite and the carbon tax, expressed as a percentage of
the price of dirty inputs, must be lower than one. In particular tdt ≤ θ < pdt and qct ≤ ϑ < +∞. Notice that if such
assumption does not hold, the model collapses to a degenerate case of a one-sector economy where the issue of directed
technical change becomes completely meaningless.
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carbon taxes and subsidies might aect the direction of technical change, they cannot always push
the economy away from a bad, carbon-intensive equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Assume ǫ > 1 and that Assumption 1 holds. Let (qct, tdt) be a policy scheme composed
by a nite subsidy qct for the clean sector and a carbon tax tdt on the production of dirty inputs lower
than their unitary price, tdt < pdt. en, there exists a nite A¯d > 0 s.t. ∀Adt > A¯d
(i) (qct, tdt) is ineective in re-directing technical change towards the clean sector,
(ii) the unique equilibrium allocation of scientists is sdt = 1 and sct = 0 for any t > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1 shows that market-based environmental policies fail whenever the productivity dif-
ferentials between the dirty and clean sectors is suciently large. e intuition behind such a result
is that once the relative productivity advantage of dirty technology is suciently big, it will always
compensate the cost of the carbon tax and the benet of the subsidy. is happens because the
policy scheme aects the relative protability of clean technology only via the market size eect.
Accordingly, potential entrepreneurs will always maximize expected prots by investing in the
carbon-intensive sector, thereby undermining the eectiveness of the carbon tax. Furthermore, the
next proposition states that the probability of passing the productivity threshold A¯d, above which
market-based policies are ineective, approaches 1 as time goes by
Proposition 2. Assume that ǫ > 1 and that Assumption 1 holds. en
lim
t→+∞
P (Adt > A¯d | t ∈ N) = 1
Proof. See Appendix A.2
e main consequence of Proposition 2 is that the timing of the introduction of market-based envi-
ronmental policies is crucial. If the economy is stacked in the bad equilibrium (sd = 1), then there
exists a boundedwindow opportunity for policy scheme (qct, tdt) to be eective. More precisely, the
window opportunity for amarket based policy introduced at time T lasts (log( Ad
AdT
))/(log(1+ηdγ))
periods.
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Remark 1. Given the evolution of the quality of the environment (Equation 6), a too much delayed
policy intervention inevitably leads to an environmental disaster. Indeed, as the economy is stacked
in a bad equilibrium (sd = 1), Ydt increases at a rate of γηd, M-B policies become ineective and St
reaches zero in nite time, thereby producing a disaster.
Remark 2. e higher the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs (ǫ), the shorter the time
window in which M-B policies are eective.
e intuition underlying the last remark is straightforward. If the elasticity of substitution
of clean and dirty inputs increases, producers will have higher incentives to switch towards the
cheaper dirty ones, creating additional demand for these inputs. Accordingly, the relative prof-
itability of dirty inputs increases, reducing the threshold Ad above which policy interventions are
ineective.
Carbon taxes are a meaningful tool for emission control policy. At the same time, Proposition
1 and 2 show that, when markets are competitive and dirty and clean inputs are substitutes, their
eectiveness cannot be guaranteed a priori. e productivity gap between carbon-intensive and
green technologies becomes crucial for the success of M-B environmental policies. In addition such
a gap widens over time due to the sub-martingale nature of machines’ productivity (cf. proof of
Proposition 2), implying that delayed interventions are likely to be ineective.
Table 1 provides numerical experiments supporting these claims. It considers dierent scenarios
dened by the expected productivity growth, initial relative backwardness of clean technologies
and the size of the subsidy. In many cases, the window of opportunity for market-based policy
lasts very few periods and, the carbon tax needed to redirect technical change is extremely high.
For example, when the productivity of clean technologies is initially half of the dirty ones and the
expected productivity growth is high, the carbon tax required to move the economy towards the
“green” equilibrium is above 35% and it has to be introduced by 30 periods. Would the backwardness
of clean technologies be higher, theminimum taxwould correspond to 61% of dirty sector’s revenues
and the window of opportunity reduces to around 20 periods.
A further insight on the potential shortness of M-B’s eectiveness period is provided by gure
1. Numerical simulations of the model under dierent technological regimes (corresponding to the
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Table 1: Minimum carbon taxes to redirect technical change and corresponding window of oppor-
tunities (in parenthesis) under dierent policy schemes.
Backwardness of Expected Subsidy (proportion of clean sector’ prots)
clean technologies productivity growth 20% 10% 5%
low (70% of dirty) 19.0% (118) 20.4% (117) 20.0% (117)
medium (50% of dirty) low 33.8% (106) 34.4% (105) 34.7% (105)
high (20% of dirty) 61.8% (76) 62.1% (75) 62.3% (75)
low (70% of dirty) 21.6% (36) 22.3% (36) 22.6% (36)
medium (50% of dirty) high 35.9% (33) 36.5% (32) 36.8% (32)
high (20% of dirty) 63.0% (23) 63.3% (22) 63.5% (22)
low (70% of dirty) 30.5% (33) 31.1% (33) 31.4% (33)
medium (50% of dirty) asymmetric 43.2% (30) 43.7% (30) 43.9% (30)
high (20% of dirty) 67.2% (20) 67.5% (20) 67.6% (20)
Low, medium and high expected productivity growth correspond to an average growth rate of machines’ productivity of,
1%, 3% and 8% respectively. With asymmetric expected productivity growth, they corresponds to 8% for dirty technologies
and 3% for clean ones.
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Figure 1: Window opportnities, minimum carbon tax and productivities under dierent technolog-
ical regimes
(a) ηd = 0.1, γ = 0.1 (b) ηd = 0.1, γ = 0.1
(c) ηd = 0.3, γ = 0.1 (d) ηd = 0.3, γ = 0.1
(e) ηd = 0.4, γ = 0.2 (f) ηd = 0.4, γ = 0.2
gures on the le column (a,c,e) show the Monte Carlo average dynamics of productivities and minimum carbon tax to
redirect technical change obtained across 100 independent runs; gures on the right column (b,d,f) show the relationship
between average carbon taxes and the ratio between clean and dirty sector productivity, each point represents a period.
Each row of gures is characterized by dierent technological regimes: low (a,b) corresponds to an average productivity
growth of 1%, medium (c,d) corresponds to an average productivity growth of 3%, high (e,f) corresponds to an average
productivity growth of 8%. All simulations are obtained seing ǫ = 10, α = 1/3 and initial the initial productivity ratio
Ac0/Ad0 = 0.8.
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technological opportunities in the two sectors) allow to illustrate the dynamics of productivities.
e laer in turns determine the magnitude of the minimum carbon tax necessary to put the econ-
omy on a “green” development path. Simulation results show that, in many circumstances, the
minimum tax rate rapidly reaches the unit, becoming ineective as a policy instrument.
Given such dismal results, are there alternative policy interventions that always redirect tech-
nical change towards the green sector, thus preventing climate catastrophes? In the next Section,
we will show that such objectives can be achieved by appropriate command-and-control policies.
4.3 Command-and-control policies
A command-and-control (C&C) policy refers to an environmental intervention that relies on regula-
tion (permission, prohibition, standard seing and enforcement) as opposed to nancial incentives,
that is, economic instruments of cost internalization (UN, 1997). In particular, we consider a policy
that establishes the maximum amount κ of dirty inputs that can be used for each unit of clean ones:7
Yct
Ydt
> κ, ∀t > T, (10)
where κ ∈ R+ represents the command-and-control policy chosen by the government and in-
troduced at time T . Given Assumption 1, in the laissez-faire equilibrium innovations start in the
more productive dirty sector. Moreover, if ǫ > 1 and given Equations (8) and (9), C&C policies (cf.
Equation 10) will be binding in equilibrium. e dirty (Ydt) and clean (Yct) inputs are employed
competitively by nal good producers, which maximizes their prots according to:
max
Yct,Ydt
{ptYt − pctYct − pdtYdt} s.t. Yt =
(
Y
ǫ−1
ǫ
ct + Y
ǫ−1
ǫ
dt
) ǫ
ǫ−1
. (11)
Under the C&C policy, rst-order conditions give:
Yct
Ydt
=
(
pc
pd
)
−ǫ
= κ. (12)
In both the laissez-faire equilibrium and market-based policies, the relative demand of inputs is
determined competitively (the relative price of clean inputs compared to dirty ones is decreasing
7e eects of such policy on the direction of technical change are equivalent to the ones of an absolute upper bound
for the use of dirty inputs. We refer to the relative threshold per unit of clean inputs to simplify computations.
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in its relative supply). In contrast, under command-and-control policies, the government indicates
a relative upper bound on the use of dirty inputs (κ), which implicitly constrains the gap between
the prices of the two sectors. Furthermore, relying on (12), it is possible to express the relative
employment in the clean sector as
Lct
Ldt
=
Yct
Ydt
(
pct
pdt
)
−
α
1−α
(
Act
Adt
)
−1
= κ(1+
α
ǫ−αǫ
)
(
Act
Adt
)
−1
. (13)
Equation (13) implies that whenever the relative demand of dirty inputs is constrained by the C&C
policy, any productivity gain in the carbon intensive sector is labor destroying. Indeed, since rms
cannot expand production, any increases in machine productivity will increase prots by reducing
the number of employees needed to serve a constant demand. e protability ratio of conducting
research in the two sectors than becomes:
Πct
Πdt
=
ηc
ηd
(
pct
pdt
) 1
1−α Lct
Ldt
Act−1
Adt−1
(14)
=
ηc
ηd
κ
ǫ−1
ǫ
(
Act
Adt
)
−1 Act−1
Adt−1
=
ηc
ηd
κ
ǫ−1
ǫ
(
1 + ηcsct
1 + ηdsdt
)
−1
,
where the second equality follows combining (7) with (12) and (13), and the third one is obtained
via (5). From the last equation it follows that under a command-and-control policy κ the expected
protability of the two sectors in equilibrium does not depend on the productivity of currently
available machines as in the laissez-faire and market-based policy cases, but only on the relative
likelihood of obtaining a successful innovation and κ. We can now state the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Consider a C&C policy κ. If ǫ > 1, then there exists a nite κ¯ > 0 such that any
κ > κ¯ always redirects technical change towards the green sector.
Proof. See Appendix A.3
emain intuition behind Proposition 3 is that any C&C policy, which suciently limits the rel-
ative share of dirty inputs, creates an additional demand for clean ones, increasing the protability
of the green sector. If such a policy is implemented, technical change moves towards a develop-
ment path where innovations occur only in the clean sector. Moreover, once the new equilibrium is
achieved, the economy behaves as in the “good” laissez faire scenario, where output Yt and use of
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clean inputs Yct grows at the long-run rate γηc (see equations 8, 9 and 4 and recall that Act grows
at a rate of γηc while Adt remains constant).
Remark 3. A temporary C&C policy intervention κ is sucient to redirect technical change per-
manently.
Indeed, as the economy moves toward a “good” equilibrium, Yct grows faster than Yd, as the
clean sector is more protable than the dirty one, thus increasing the ratio Yct/Ydt. e command-
and-control policy sustains the improvement of machines’ productivity in the clean sector, thereby
increasing the ratio Act/Adt. When such ratio becomes suciently high, the C&C policy is not
needed anymore as research is spontaneously performed only in the clean sector.
Command-and-control policies can always redirect technical change towards the clean sector,
but are they able to prevent of natural disasters (St = 0)? In other words, what happens to the
environment when in equilibrium innovation occurs only in the green sector?
Given the results in Acemoglu et al. (2012) and using equations (8) and (9), one can conclude
that when all scientists are allocated to the clean sector (sct = 1), the production of dirty inputs
(Ydt) grows at a rate (1 + γηc)
α+γ − 1 > 0, if the the two inputs are weak substitutes (i.e. 1 < ǫ <
1/(1−α)). In contrast, when inputs are strong substitutes (ǫ > 1/(1−α)), Ydt behaves in the long
run as Aα+ϕct , which in turns decreases over time.
e above results imply that appropriate climate policies are able to prevent environmental
catastrophes only when dirty and clean inputs are strong substitutes. More precisely, C&C policies
are always successful in avoiding St to reach zero, whereas M-B solutions are eective only if they
are implemented at the right time. If inputs are weak substitutes instead, nal good production
requires increasing amount of dirty inputs which cannot be replaced by clean ones, even though
the productivity of dirty machines keeps constant. As a results an environmental disasters looks
inevitable.
Given such a gloomy perspective, is there an environmental policy that work even if clean and
dirty inputs are weak substitutes? e next proposition provides a positive answer:
Proposition 4. Let κˆ be a C&C policy imposing a xed ceiling on the use of dirty inputs Ydt such that
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Ydt ≤ κˆ. en, there exists a nite κˆ
′ > 0 such that ∀ κˆ ∈ (0, κˆ′) the policy always redirects technical
change towards the green sector and prevents an environmental disaster.
Proof. See Appendix A.4
e claim follows straightforwardly from proposition 3 and equation (6).8 A xed-ceiling C&C
policy is always eective, even when the dirty and clean inputs are complementary, whereas in
Acemoglu et al. (2012) disasters can be avoided only by switching o economic growth.
e results obtained from our policy exercises are summarized in Table 2. Only a C&C policy
xing themaximal amount of dirty inputs in the economy is always able to guarantee both technical
change redirection and avoidance of environmental disasters. Marked-based solutions are eective
only within their limited window of opportunity but, in general, they fail to guarantee disasters’
prevention.
e lack of symmetry between the eects produced by the two types of policy instruments is
aributable to the role of path dependence in technical change. In the laissez-faire and M-B cases,
innovation has a self-perpetuating nature grounded on its own past success. is makes more
and more dicult over time the transition to a clean equilibrium. On the contrary, in the C&C
scenario, the labour destroying eect of innovation (see equation 13) exactly compensates the direct
productivity eect, thus removing the dependence of this policy from the relative productivity gap
of machines.9
5 Conclusions
In this work, we have extended the model developed in Acemoglu et al. (2012) to compare the
impact of environmental market-based (M-B) policies with command-and-control (C&C) ones. M-B
8emaximum Ydt allowed by the regulation policy at time tmust be belowSt−1/ξ in order to prevent the realization
of an environmental disaster.
9Also the use of a carbon tax equal to the price of dirty inputs would completely remove expected prots in that
sector, triggering a complete shi toward the clean technology. However, this scenario is not feasible from a political
perspective (see also Goulder and Parry, 2008, on the generally low political workability of carbon taxes) andmeaningless
from an economic one (see Section 4.2).
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Table 2: Policy intervention and guaranteed results
redirection of technical change prevention of environmental disaster
weak substitutes strong substitutes weak substitutes strong substitutes
Market based
Taxes window only window only no window only
Subsidies window only window only no window only
Taxes and Subsidies window only window only no window only
Optimal Policy window only window only no window only
Command and control
Relative share yes yes no yes
Absolute limit yes yes yes yes
policies are grounded on a carbon tax and a subsidy to the green sector, whereas C&C interventions
x limits to the production of dirty inputs and related greenhouse gas emissions.
We nd that market-based policies are not always successful to redirect technical change from
the dirty to the green sector. Given the cumulativeness of technical change (Aghion et al., 2015),
time is fundamental and there is a limited window of opportunity to trigger a green transition.
Indeed, if the productivity gap between the dirty and green sectors becomes too high, M-B poli-
cies becomes ineective. e time for an eective intervention gets shorter if the two inputs are
“weak” substitutes. In the laer case, market-based policies are never able to prevent environmen-
tal catastrophes. On the contrary, if the dirty and green inputs are “strong” substitutes, timely M-B
interventions can successfully avoid the occurrence of disasters.
Command-and-control policies can always redirect technical change toward the green sector.
In that, they are more eective than market-based interventions. Such result occurs because M-B
policies work only via the market size channel (larger input sector stimulates innovation), whereas
C&C interventions also aect the relative price and are not limited by the productivity gap between
dirty and green technologies (cf. Equation 7). is explains why the evolution of the technologies do
not aect the success of command-and-control policies, which are also always eective in prevent-
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ing environmental disasters when inputs are strong substitutes. If the dirty and green inputs are
weak substitutes, the only environmental policy that always allows to avoid a climate catastrophe
is a C&C intervention xing an absolute limit on the use of polluting inputs.
Our ndings support the current behavior of governments, which are timid in introducing car-
bon pricing, relying instead on regulations that redirect investment towards clean capital, such
as stricter energy eciency standards on new capital and buildings (IEA, 2016). Beyond inducing
the development of clean technologies, such regulatory measures are eective in preventing the
occurrence of environmental disasters.
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A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Proposition 1
We divide the proof in two parts. First, we show that the policy scheme (qct, tdt) with qct ≤ ϑ <
+∞ and tdt ≤ θ < pdt is not able to redirect technical change, then we characterize the unique
equilibrium.
In the model, the more the dirty sector is protable, the more researchers devote eort to in-
novate therein, the more dirty machines become productive and the relative share of dirty inputs
increases. Under the policy scheme (qct, tdt), the protability of the two sectors is determined by
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three elements, namely the productivity ratio, the price of dirty inputs and the carbon tax:
Πct
Πdt
= (1 + qct)
ηc
ηd
(
pdt − td
pd
)
−ǫ(Act
Adt
)
−ϕ−1 Act−1
Adt−1
= (1 + qct)
ηc
ηd
(
pdt − td
pd
)
−ǫ( 1 + γηcsct
1 + γηdsdt
)
−ϕ−1(Act−1
Adt−1
)
−ϕ
, (15)
where the second line follows from (5) and where ϕ = (1− ǫ)(1− α) < 0 and sct = 1− sdt. Let
f(s) = (1 + qct)
ηc
ηd
(
pdt − td
pd
)
−ǫ( 1 + γηcs
1 + γηd(1− s)
)
−ϕ−1(Act−1
Adt−1
)
−ϕ
,
where s = sct = 1− sdt. If f(0) < 1, then s = 0 is an equilibrium where all scientists devote their
eort toward the dirty sector.
By assumption the economy is initially stacked in the bad equilibrium where productivity-
improving innovations take place only for dirty machines. A carbon tax on the production of dirty
inputs tdt, and a subsidy qct, introduced at time T , are able to redirect technical change if they
guarantee f(0) > 1, which corresponds to:
(1 + qcT )
ηc
ηd
(
pdT − tdT
pd
)
−ǫ
(1 + γηd)
ϕ+1
(
AcT−1
AdT−1
)
−ϕ
> 1. (16)
We analyze the case where the government provides the maximum possible subsidy, qcT = ϑ. If
the tax is not able to redirect technical change in such scenario, then it would not be eective for
all qcT < ϑ as well (results do not change if the maximum available tax is xed and one studies
how subsidy aects technical change). e tax is eective in redirecting technical change if the
following condition is satised:
tdT > pdT −
[
(1 + ϑ)
ηc
ηd
(1 + ηdγ)
ϕ+1
(
AcT−1
AdT−1
)
−ϕ
] 1
ǫ
pdT . (17)
Given the productivity of machines in the dirty sector r, dene g(r):
g(r) := pdT −
[
(1 + ϑ)
ηc
ηd
(1 + ηdγ)
ϕ+1
(
AcT−1
r
)
−ϕ
] 1
ǫ
pdT .
g(r) is a continuous function in (0;+∞) and satises:
lim
r→+∞
g(r) = pdT .
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Without loss of generality, let θ = pdT − δ with δ ∈ R
+. en, using the denition of limit,
for all δ > 0, it exists a A¯d ≪∞, such that for all, r > A¯d, one obtains
pdT − g(r) < δ,
which in turns implies g(r) > pdT − δ. Finally, there exists a nite r and a suciently low δ such
that, in order to redirect technical change, it is required
tdT > g(r) > θ,
which is impossible because it contradicts our assumptions.
Now let us show that the equilibriumwhere all researchers are employed in the dirty sector (s =
0) is also the unique equilibriumwhenAdT−1 is suciently large. Two cases must be distinguished.
First, if 1 + ϕ > 0, then f(s) is strictly decreasing in s and f(0) < 1 guarantees that s = 0 is
the unique equilibrium. e previous condition can be rewrien as follows:
f(0) = (1 + ϑ)
ηc
ηd
(
pdT − tdT
pdT
)
−ǫ
(1 + ηdγ)
ϕ+1
(
AcT−1
AdT−1
)
−ϕ
< 1,
which implies
(
AcT−1
AdT−1
)
−ϕ
<
ηd
ηc(1 + ϑ)
(
pdT − tdT
pdT
)ǫ( 1
1 + ηdγ
)ϕ+1
= Ψ, (18)
whereΨ > 0. As ǫ > 1, the le hand side of (18) is a continuous function monotonically decreasing
in AdT−1 which tends to 0 as the productivity of machines in the dirty sector becomes larger and
larger. is proves that for a suciently largeAdT−1, the unique equilibrium allocation of scientists
satises s = 0.
Now consider the second case where 1 + ϕ < 0. As f(s) is strictly increasing in s, the unique
equilibrium is s = 0 only if f(0) < f(1) < 1, where the rst inequality is obviously satised.
Consider the second inequality:
f(1) = (1 + ϑ)
ηc
ηd
(
pdT − tdT
pdT
)
−ǫ
(1 + ηcγ)
−ϕ−1
(
AcT−1
AdT−1
)
−ϕ
< 1.
Accounting for the time the tax is introduced and aer some algebra it becomes
(
AcT−1
AdT−1
)
−ϕ
<
ηd
ηc(1 + ϑ)
(
pdT − tdT
pdT
)ǫ
(1 + ηcγ)
ϕ+1 = Ψ′,
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with Ψ′ > 0. Analogously to the previous case, it is easy to see that for a suciently high AdT−1
the equilibrium s = 0 is unique. Finally, if 1 + ϕ = 1 then f(s) ≡ f is constant and f < 1, surely
veried for some large AdT−1, is sucient to obtain the unique equilibrium s = 0.
A.2 Proposition 2
e proof relies upon the nature of the stochastic process characterizing the evolution of machines’
productivity, i.e.
Ajt =


(1 + γsjt)Ajt−1, with probability ηj
Ajt−1, with probability (1− ηj)
with j = {c, d} as usual. As E(Ajt |Aj0, ..., Ajt−1) ≥ Ajt−1 for all t, Ajt is a submartingale. is
implies that the expected productivity of dirty machines explodes as time goes by if no emission
control policy is undertaken. Moreover, let A¯d be the lowest threshold such that any AdT > A¯d
prevents inequality (16) to be satised while let (18) holding. In principle, A¯d can take any real
number. However, we assume, without loss of generality, that A¯d is an element of the sequence
{Ad0(1 + γ)
n}∞n=0. Since the economy starts from the initial bad equilibrium where sd0 = 1, the
probability of exceeding the threshold can be wrien as
P (Adt > A¯d, | t ∈ N, t > n) = 1−
n−1∑
i=0
(
t
t− i
)
(1− ηd)
iηt−id ,
= 1−
[
qt + tpqt−1 + ...+
t(t− 1)...(t− n+ 2)
(n+ 1)!
pn−1qt−n−1
]
,
where q = ηd and p = 1− ηd. Now let us study the probability limit of exceeding the threshold as
time goes by. Since 0 < ηd < 1, one obtains that
lim
t→+∞
P (Adt > A¯d | t ∈ N, t > n) = 1.
A.3 Proposition 3
First, we notice that equation (14) can be expressed as
g(s) =
ηc
ηd
κ
ǫ−1
ǫ
(
1 + ηcs
1 + ηd(1− s)
)
−1
, (19)
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where s = sct = 1 − sdt. As the economy is stacked in the bad equilibrium, in order to redirect
technical change, a command-and-control policy κ should satisfy g(0) > 1. is implies that s = 1
is the unique equilibrium allocation of scientists. Imposing previous condition (g(0) > 1) one
obtains:
ηc
ηd
κ
ǫ−1
ǫ (1 + ηc)
−1 > 1. (20)
e laer condition can be easily expressed as
κ > κ¯
κ¯ =
(
ηd(1+ηc)
ηc
) ǫ
ǫ−1
.
(21)
Notice that κ¯ is strictly positive and does not depend on the relative productivity of machines (at
any instant of time). In addition as κ ∈ (0,∞), there will always be a C&C policy κ > κ¯ that
successfully redirects technical change.
A.4 Proposition 4
Let us start noticing that Assumption 1 implies the command-and-control policy scheme to be bind-
ing, that is Ydt = κˆ. erefore, by solving the model in section 4.3, one obtains that (similarly to
proposition 3’s proof) technical change is redirected towards the “green” equilibrium sct = 1 and
sdt = 0 if
Yct
κˆ
>
(
ηd(1 + ηc)
ηc
) ǫ
ǫ−1
, (22)
which easily translates in
κˆ < Yct
ηc
ηd(1 + ηc)
ǫ
ǫ−1
. (23)
Since Yct, ηc, ηd and ǫ are strictly positive, there always exists an absolute C&C policy κˆ > 0 able
to redirect technical change.
An environmental disaster is avoided if St is permanently positive aer policy intervention.
Since Ydt is bounded from above, it suces that κˆ < St−1/ξ to prevent an environmental catastro-
phe. erefore, any C&C policy such that
κˆ < κˆ′
κˆ′ = min
(
St−1/ξ, Yct
ηc
ηd(1+ηc)
ǫ
ǫ−1
) (24)
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always guarantees the redirection of technical change towards the clean sector and the avoidance
of environmental disaster.
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